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Defendant and Respondent.

Brief of Appellant
NATURE OF CASE
This suit was brought by the appellant, Mona C.
Hudson, against the respondent, Union Pacific Railroad Company, to recover damages for personal injuries
sustained in a crossing accident. The appellant was
a passenger in an automobile driven by one Era Jones.
The automobile and a freight train of the respondent
had a crossing collision. At the close of the trial the
court directed a verdict of no cause of action, and this
appeal was taken.
1

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
It will aid the court in a study of the facts to
know that the motion for a directed verdict was made
on the following grounds: (1) a denial of any negligence on the part of the railroad; ( 2) a denial that
the negligence, if 1any, was a proximate cause of appellant's injuries; (3) a claim that appellant was guilty
of contributory negligence as a matter of law; and
( 4) a claim that the evidence showed that the negligence of Era Jones, the driver of the car, was the sole
proximate cause of the accident. (R. 269) The record
does not disclose the basis for the trial court's ruling
-it may have been on any one or on all of the four
points specified. It also will be helpful to the court to
know at the outset that appellant claims negligence in
the failure of the tr:ain to give warning of the approaching train; denies that she was guilty of contributory negligence as a mat·ter of law, and in addition
claims that the respondent had the last clear chance
to avoid the 1accident. (R. 4)
There is a conflict in the testimony on some of the
matters of fact. Where there is a direct conflict, we
state only that portion which favors the position of the
appellant. This is done because the court directed a
verdict against appellant and thus ruled that :as a
matter of law there was no view of the evidence which
would have permitted the appellant to recover.
This accident happened on May 1st, 1948, near
Logandale, Nev:ada. (R. 52) The day was clear. (R.
249) The collision occurred at about 3:15 p.m. (R.
2
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:2-l~l) The appellant was a passenger in the car. She
was riding in the front seat on the right hand side.
She and .Jlrs. Jones were just out for a ride. Mrs.
Jones had wanted to take ;a gift to some people who
liYed near Logandale and jlrs. Hudson, the appellant,
went with her. rrhey had delivered the gift and then
had decided to go for a ride. (R. 74, 75, 87) Mrs.
Hudson had ridden with .Jirs. Jones many times before. (R. 77) .Jirs. Jones was a good driver and she
\\·as paying close attention to the road. (R. 77, 102)
The appellant and .Jirs. Jones were talking casually.
(R. 93) The windows on both sides of the car were
open. (R. 93) Xeither appellant nor ~Irs. Jones were
hard of hearing·. (R. 105) Appellant thought that
.Jirs. Jones \Yas "paying every attention" to her driving. (R. 71) By frequently riding with her, the a:ppellant had determined that Mrs. Jones was a competent
driYer. There had never been any reason for appellant
to be nervous ·while riding with her. (R. 77) The car
was going slow. One witness placed the speed at about
18 miles per hour. (R. 225) It is also clear that the
driver, ~Irs. Jones, knew of the location of the railroad
track. The ear had crossed over the tracks just a few
minutes before. They had found the road they were
traveling to be partially blocked and had turned around
within a short distance after crossing the track, and
were returning to the same crossing. (R. 75, 191, 220)

The railroad track was a single track. (Ex. 3 and
4) It ran in a general north-south direction. (R. 54)
It was essentially straight for some distance before
reaching the highway. (R. 261) The train was going
3
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toward the south. (R. 61) At mile post number 85-1,
near Logandale, N eVIada, this track crossed a country
road. (R. 52) The road was winding, but its general
course was also north-south. The car in which plaintiff was riding was going toward the south along this
road, but as the ro1ad turned to go up over the tracks
the car would be facing toward the west. (R. 61) Thus
the road crossed the track at approximately right angles.
We believe that the course of the road, its location
and elevation, are of import1ance insofar as the issue
of contributory negligence is concerned. vVe, therefore, start to the north and east where car turned and
trace t~e course of that road to the crossing. Appellant
testified that the car had come from Logandale, crossed
the tracks at the crossing here involved and had gone
north for some short distance. She said that ''when
we got down in the ravine, we couldn't get through
and we turned around and came back." (R. 75) Since
the jury could have believed this, it is perhaps
not necessary to describe the area beyond the ravine.
There is considerable evidence on this, however, and
we refer to it briefly. Keate, the deputy sheriff, testified that beyond the ravine, to the north, the road
would be 1about one mile from the tracks.

(R. 58)

There is a ridge that runs east and west and the tracks
run north and south. One could see the tracks coming
into view but because of this ridge, one could not see
north along them. (R. 64) Then the road dips down
into a ravine. The sheriff said that a train crew might
be 1able to look down on the top of the car, but that
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passengers In the car could not have seen the train
while the car was in the ravine. (R. 64, 67) The road
is down in this ravine for about one-eighth of a mile.
(R. G7) ~\s the road comes up out of the ravine, it is
more or less facing the track. The track can be seen
hE>~ad on, but there is a hill or ridge which prevents
anyone in a car fron1 seeing north along the track at
this point. (R. G-!. 67) Exhibit 1, ·which is a rough
sketch n1ade by Sheriff l~eate, shows the road facing
the track but to the right of the road (north) there
is a hill shown which blocks the view to the north. ( R. 70)
The hill can abo be seen in the photographs introduced
by the railroad.
The fact that the road is so low that the passengers
in the car could not see the train while in the ravine,
together with the fact that even as the car came up
out of the ravine (facing the tracks) the tracks to the
north were hidden from view is important because, as
will be hereinafter noted in detail, there is evidence
from which the jury could have found that the train
was behind (north of) the car as the car came out of
the ravine. (R. 224) In any event the road dips into
the ravine where the t:rtain crew might have been able
to see the top of the car, but the passengers in the
car could not have seen the train. (R. 64, 67) Thereafter the road turns to the west to come up from the
ravine. As it comes out of the ravine the tracks could
have been seen head on, but a small hill blocks vision
to the north along the tracks. (Ex. 1, R. 57, 64-67)
The road then turns 'abruptly and goes parallel to the
traeks. Exhibit 3 is a good picture of the turn just
5
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after the road leaves the ravine. The road then is
parallel to the track for some 300 feet. (R. 55) It is
approximately 75 feet from the track along this 300foot strip. (R. 55, 150) The road then turns abruptly
to the right and goe·s· up 'a sharp incline to cross the
tracks. (R. 55) This also is shown by Exhibit 3 and
by Exhibit 1 (the sheriff's sketch).
Insofar as elevation is concerned, the sheriff testified that the road was considerably lower than the
track. He was asked : ''And they would see it [the
train] for this 300 feet that it par1allels the track f"
And he answered : ''Yes, they would if they looked
straight up." . (R. 68) At page 67, the sheriff said
they could have seen the train had it been on the track
opposite them if they had looked "up at an angle."
Jenkins, an engineer, testified also that the train
could not have been seen from the ravine, (R. 152)
and that the road went up a sharp incline as it went
up onto the tracks. (R. 154) This incline onto the
track is also mentioned by Mace, a brakeman. (R. 206-7)
M1ace also testified that he could see the top of the car
in the ravine (R. 202) but he did not know whether
or not he could see the occupants. (R. 203)
MOVEMENT OF THE CAR AND TRAI~
As. to th-e movements of the car and the train,
t~H~.~e IS some conflict. It IS -clear that the car
firsJ cross'ed the tracks while it was going toward -the
north_. The ~ppellarit testified that the car turned
arourid~in 'fhe ravine. CR. 75, 90) Other witnesses (the
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railroad crew) testified that they saw the car turn
around and start back south along the road toward
the crossing. (R. 191) The car was not traveling fast.
One of the railroad employees estimated the speed to
be about 18 miles per hour. (R. 223) The engineer
who had control of the train ·was on the right hand
side of the cab. (R. 165) He perhaps could have seen
to the left, but he \Yas not looking. ( R. 166) The left
side of the train \\·as being watched by the fireman,
'and it was his duty to watch to the left. (R. 167) He
testified that he saw the car turn around near the dam,
(R. 201) and kept his eyes on the car and saw it
proceeding along this road and saw it go down into
the ravine. (R. 202) He said he could see the top of
the car at all points, (R. 197) and that he did not know
whether he could see the driver when the car was down
in the ravine. (R. 202) He also said that he saw the
car proceeding along the strip parallel to the train
but that he did not say anything to the engineer; (R.
204) that it looked as though the driver of the car
was not paying any attention to the car at all. (R. 205)
He was asked : ''By the way the car was being opera ted,
it appeared they had never seen the train 1 Answer:
"That is right." He never, at any time, warned the
engineer that the car was approaching the tracks. (R.
205) Sheriff Keate corroborated this by his testimony
that when he interviewed the train crew he was advised
by them that they had observed the car for a quarter
of a mile approaching the crossing. (R. 60) It thus
appears clear that the car went over the crossing, went
some distance north along the road, that it turned

7
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around and proceeded back toward the crossing at a
speed of 18 miles per hour. At least while it was down
in the ravine the occupants of the car could not see
the train but the train crew could see the top of the
car. (R. 198) As the train came out of the ravine,
the sheriff's drawing, Exhibit 1, shows the road approaching the track at right angles, but because there
was a hill to the right of the road the occupants of
the car, 'according to the sheriff, could not have seen
north along the tracks, but they could have seen the
tracks head-on. (R. 64-68) There is evidence from
which the jury could have found that the train was
not on the tracks at that point, (R. 104) but that it was
north, and behind this hill as the car came out of the
ravine. (R. 224) The car then turned to the left and
paralleled the tracks for some 300 feet, (R. 55) and
without changing speed or doing anything to indicate
that its occupants had seen the train, (R. 205) proceeded
'at the same speed onto the crossing. The train coming
from behind the car (R. 224) could only have been seen
on this 300-foot strip had appellant looked back and up
at a sharp angle. (R. 68)
The appellant's testimony is that she did not see
the train at all until it was right on them, 'and all she
had time to say was, "Oh, my God." (R. 76) She
did give a statement to the railroad claims agent in
which she indicated that she had seen the train for
some fifty feet before the impact. However, both the
appellant and the claims agent who took the statement
testified that he had pressed her to make an estimate
of the distance, that before any distance was mentioned
8
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:'he had advised hin1 that the train was right on them
before she saw it, and that she only had time to exclaim, "'Oh, n1y God" before the impact. (R. 96-98,
129) This ren1ark was not placed by the claims agent
in the statement which he had had the appellant sign.
There is nothing in the statement inconsistent with her
testimony at the trial, except the estimate that the train
\\·as fifty feet away. The circumstances under which
this statement was given, as testified to by the appellant and 'admitted by the claims agent (R. 129) are
such that the jury could have found that her testimony
at the trial was true and that the train \Yas right upon
them before she noticed it. (R. 76)

I 'lei

JJif

Insofar as the movement of the train is ·concerned,
the testimony is that it was moving at a speed of from
15 miles per hour (R. 225) to 20 miles per hour. (R.
158) At 20 miles per hour the train could have stopped
in 120 feet. (R. 169) There is no evidence as to how
quickly it could have stopped at 15 miles per hour. It
was proceeding down the straight track with some
members of the crew keeping the car in sight at all
times, but without warning the engineer that the car
was approaching. (R. 192) As the car came out of the
ravine it was ahead of the train. :Mrs. Hudson so testified and one of the train crew corroborated her as
follows: (R. 224-5)
~r r.

Oliver:

Q. You saw the car again as it came up
out of the ravine~
A.

Y.es.
9
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,
Q. Just before it started on that parallel
strip to go to the track~
A.

Y.es.

Q. And to that point was the car a little
behind you, or a little ahead of you~ [Note:
Oliver was riding in the cab on the engine at
front of train. (R. 218)]
A. It was a little ahead of me.

Q. The car was a little ahead of you as it
cam·e up out of the ravine?
A. Yes.
Q. Assuming this-this is the bottom of
the ravine, here is the car as it proceeds back
before making this turn to the parallel-before
it came to this point to go parallel with the track,
you understand this map, I take it
A. Yes.

Q. It was right along in here (indicates)¥
A.

Y.es.

Q. At that time the train was to the rear
a short distance?
A.

Y.es.

Q.

Back of the car?

A.

Y.es.

Q. You are sure of that?
A. Y.es.
Mrs. Hudson testified: (R. 104)
Q. Did you ·ever at any time prior to the
time when you looked up and s·aw the train, did
you ever look toward the right to the railroad
track when you were traveling on that 300-foot
strip?
10
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.:\. AftPr we caine out of the cut, naturally
I looked out of the cut, I didn't see a train there
at that time. The train \Yas coming back of us.
She might have seen it out of the rear vision
mirror. I didn't have a rear vision mirror.
Q.

the

you

You say you looked as you came out of

ravine~

A.

Yes.

Q.

As you traveled that 300-foot strip did

look~

A. I do not know whether I looked or not.
\Yhen we made that turn the train was right on
us-unless she was looking in the rear vision
mirror I do not know how she could have seen
it because the t:ra.in was back of us all the time.
The appellant testified that she did not hear a
bell or a whistle. (R. 79, 85, 107) Her hearing was all
right. (R. 79) The car windows were down. (R. 78)
They were talking only casually. (R. 93) The radio
was not on, ( R. 85) and the speed of the car was so
slow that there would have been no wind noise. (R. 225)
The car was on a road which under the uncontradicted
evidence was within 75 feet of the track. (R. 55) The
engine was equi'pped with a bell, (R. 159) and had an
air whistle which would give a very shrill sound. (R. 158)
With the car as close behind the car as it obviously
was, the physical factors are such as to suggest that
the whistle was not blown. With a powerful air whistle,
under the circumstances indicated above, the train crew
who observed the car's approach to the tracks should
have been able to literally shake it with sound vibration, and certainly should have been able to bring home
1

11

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

to the driver of the car that the train was approachUnless one is to attribute an intention on the
part of the driver and of the appellant to commit suicide by driving in front of the train, one must conclude that they did not hear any warning signal. We
think that the fact that they did drive up on the track
is itself evidence that they did not hear ~any signal
and that under the circumstances they could not have
helped hearing it had it been sounded.

ing~

We desire to emphasize in this statement of facts
that the train crew observed the car at all times. This
is not eontradicted. It is. admitted by the engineer
tand by the fireman that it was: the fireman's duty to
watch for traffic approaching the train from the left
side, (R. 167) that he did see the car approaching;
that the car did nothing to. indicate that the driver
had seen the train, (R. 205) and that the firem·an gave
no warning whatever to the engineer until after the
car had arrived directly in front of the train and a
collision was unavoidable. (R. 192) At that time he
shouted to the engineer to ~apply the brakes. The extent and nature of Mrs. Hudson"s injuries are not
rna terial here.

12
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::.:-

ARGUl\fENT
POIXT I. THERE \Y AS EYIDENCE FROM WHICH
A JURY COULD HAVE DETERMINED THAT
THE R~\ILRO.A.D \YAS NEGLIGENT.
\Y e argue the question of the railroad's negligence
because it is one of the bases assigned by the reS'pondent
for its n1otion for a directed verdict.

The negligence relied upon by the defendant is that
the train crew failed to give adequate warning of its
approach. It is our contention that respondent had
both a statutory duty and a common law duty to warn
the occupants of the car of the train's approach. We
contend that the jury could have found (1) that no
warning whatever was given and (2) that even had
the jury believed the train crew to the effect that a
signal \Yas given, it could nevertheless have found that
the warning given was not adequate under the circumstances of this case.
THE CoMMON

LAw DuTY

\Ve contend that even were there no statute requiring the respondent to give a warning of the approach of its train to a crossing, it nevertheless would
have had, 'and did have, a common law duty to warn
the car of the train's approach. The circumstances which
required the train crew to give a warning of its approach are as follows: The jury would have been
compelled to find under the uncontradicted testimony
that the train crew saw the 0ar turn around; (R. 191)
that the fireman, whose duty it was to watch for cars

13
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approaching the train from the left hand side, saw
the car at all times after it turned around; that he could
see it go down into the ravine, (R. 197) see the top
of it while it was in the ravine, (R. 198) watch it come
out of the ravine and ·pull on to the tracks. (R. 198-204)
The car had done nothing whatever to suggest that
the driver had seen the train. ( R. 205) · Still the fireman did not advise the engineer that the car was approaching. (R. 192) The distance that the fireman
thus observed the car was considerable. It was in the
ravine for nearly one quarter of a mile and paralleled
the tracks for 300 feet after coming out of the ravine.
The jury could have found that the train was coming
from directly behind the car. (R. 224) It was above
it so the occupants of the car could only have seen
the train by looking backwards and up at a sharp angle.
(R. 224, 67-68) With the crew knowing that the train
and the car were thus 'approaching a crossing, the
crew had a common law duty either to adjust the speed
of the train to avoid an accident or to warri the car
of its approach.
The train was only going 15 miles an hour according to one- witness, 'and at 20 miles per hour could have
come to a complete stop in 120 feet. (R. 165, 169)
It had a bell and a shrill whistle. The car was only
75 feet away and while it was slightly ahead of the
train, (R. 224) they traveled parallel to e•ach other
for 300 feet.
Under the view of the evidence most favorable to
the appellant, the jury could have conclud~d that no
14
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signal of any kind \Yas giYen. It rnust be remembered
that under the evidence, the car was traveling only
~about 18 rniles per hour.
(R. 225) The train was
going between 15 and 20 n1iles 'per hour. ( R. 158, 225)
\Yhile the jury could have placed the car slightly ahead
of the train as it turned down the 300-foot strip of
road parallel to the tracks, the car still would have
been within 75 feet of the engine of the train. (R. 55)
The car "\vindows were all down. (R. 78) The radio
was not on. (R. 85) The occupants of the car were
talking only casually. (R. 93) It was a clear day,
out in the country. (R. 249) It is almost a certainty
that the occupants of the car did not hear any signa],
for the car did go onto the track directly in front of
the train. All of these facts the jury had before it.
It also had the positive testimony of Mrs. Hudson that
the bell was not sounded and the whistle was not blown.
(R. 79, 85, 107) On page 107 she was asked: ''Didn't
you hear 'a whistle at all~" Answer: "Absolutely
there was no whistle of any kind.'' On page 85 she
"·as asked: '' \Y as anything going on in the car itself,
or outside the car that distracted your attention so you
couldn't have heard a whistle had one been blown~"
Answer: ''X o, there wasn't anything, there wasn't any
whistle blown.'' On page 79 she testified that she did
not hear the bell or any other sound until just before
the impact. The jury thus could have believed that
no signal of any kind was given. Mrs. Hudson so
testified.
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Taking the view of the evidence most favorable
to the respondent, (which is exactly opposite from
15
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what should be done) the best that C'an be said for
the train crew is that at some distance back from the
crossing they sounded a standard whistle warning. The
whistle which the crew said was sounded was a standard "two longs, 'a short, and a long" and that is known
as the crossing whistle. (R. 159) The engineer did
not know exactly how far from the crossing the train
was when he sounded the whistle, but finally said that
he guessed he was about one quarter of a mile from
the crossing when he started to sound the whistle. (R.
174) Even though the car was slightly ahead of the
train some 75 feet away, (R. 224) and going parallel
to it for 300 feet, no other or further whistle signal
was given. The crew did testify that a bell was sounded
continuously. In this regard, however, the engineer
said the bell was not 'a very loud bell, ( R. 172) and
another member of the crew said that you could not
ordinarily hear the bell in the caboose with the train
running. (R. 252)
Thus under the most unfavorable view of the evidence, the most the tra~n crew did was to give a
standard whistle signal some distance hack from the
crossing and ring a bell which was not a "very loud
bell,'' and which could not be heard as far hack as the
caboose. With a car ahead of the train and approaching
the crossing, with nothing to suggest that the occupants
had yet seen the train, and with the tnain crew watching
the car at all times, the jury could certainly have found
that the respondent, in the exercise of reasonable care,
should have sounded the shrill whistle again while the
car and the train were within 75 feet of e1ach other and
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parallel for 300 feet. This wa~ not done. With
a train going· 20 miles per hour, it could have stopped
in ~~~s than 1:20 feet had the engineer been aware of
the approaching danger. (R. 169) There is evidence
that it was going only 15 miles per hour, (R. 225) and
thus could have stopped in considerably less than 120
feet. At this slow speed the train could have been slowed
slightly to await the further action of the car, or the
engineer, who had control of the signals, could have
made certain that the occupants of the car bad seen the
train. Instead the fireman remained silent. The engineer relied on the fireman to watch that side of the
train, and did not even glance in that direction. (R. 162)
And they gambled that the car driver would hear or see
the train. 'Ye believe that this failure of the fireman
to warn the engineer of the approaching car, and the
failure of the train crew to give a whistle signal as the
train and car proceeded parallel for 300 feet, could
have been classed as negligence by a jury.
STATUTORY DuTY

In addition to the common law duty, we also rely
upon the statutory duty of a railroad to give a warning
as it approaches !a crossing. At the close of the trial,
counsel for respondent attempted to introduce statutes
of the State of Nevada. Since the Nevada law was not
pleaded, it could not be introduced and the Utah Court
would be compelled to presume that the Nevada l~aw
was the same as the law of the State of Utah. In other
words, where there is no evidence to show that the law
where an accident happens is different from the law of

17
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the forum, then the presumption is that the law of the
forum and the law of the place where the accident happened are the same. See Dickson v. Mull,ings, 66 Utah
282, 241 P. 2d 840, 43 A.L.R., 136.
In this regard there is not very much difference
anyway because the Nevada statutes which were read
into the record in the absence of the jury, (R. 263) and
our Utah Statute, Section 77-0-14, Utah Code Annotated,
1943, ~are not materially different. The Nevada statute,
Volume 3, Section 6276, Com'piled Laws of Nevada, 1949,
required a train to ring a bell of at least 20 pounds
weight at a distance of at least 80 rods from the place
where the railroad shall cross any street, ro!ad or highway. In this regard it should be noted that there was
no evidence introduced by the railroad to show that the
bell which was rung weighed 20 pounds or more. Counsel
for respondent attempted to get the railroad employees
to so testify, but the testimony was to the effect that
they did not know its weight. (R. 159)
The Utah statute provides:
''Every locomotive shall be provided with a
bell and it shall be rung continuously from a
point not less than eighty rods from any city
or town or public highway grade crossing, until
such city or town, street or such grade crossing
shall be crossed. But except in towns and at
terminal points the sounding of locomotive
whistle or signal one-fourth of a mile before
reaching such gr·ade crossing, shall be deemed ·
equivalent to the ring of the bell as aforesaid."
Thus under either the Nevada law or under the
Utah law, the respondent was compelled to ring a bell
18
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at lea~t eighty rods before reaching the crossing. Under
Xevada law that bell must have weighed at least 20
pounds, 'and there was no alternative which permitted
the sounding of a whistle. In Utah the bell did not have
to be of any particular weight, and the sounding of the
whistle could take the place of ringing the bell. We
think that the Utah law applies because the Nevada law
was not pleaded. In the case of Buhler r. llladdison, 105,
Utah 39, 140 P. 2d 933, the Utah court refused to consider X evada statutes which were introduced but not
pleaded, and we think that such is the rule which must
be followed here. It is a well established rule of law
that in the absence of proof it will be presumed that the
law of another state is the S'ame as the law of the forum,
and the court will administer and apply the law of the
jurisdiction until the law of the situs is shown. Dickson
v. Mullings, 66 Utah 282, 241 P. 2d 840, 43 A.L.R. 136.
In any event, regardless of which law is applied, there
was a statutory duty on the part of the railroad to give
a warning as it approached the crossing. The jury could
have found from the testimony of Mrs. Hudson that no
warning signal was given. (R. 79, 85, 107) There are
numerous cases to the effect that a jury question is
presented on the issue of negligence where !a person, in
a position to hear, testifies that he did not hear a whistle
or bell. In this regard the case of Earle v. Salt Lake &
Utah Railroad, 109 Utah 111, 165 P. 2d 877 is in point.
There the jury had only the testimony of witnesses that
they did not hear a signal even though they were situated
so that they could have heard it had one been given.
The Supreme Court said (R. 114) that this presented a
jury question.
19
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POINT NO. 11: THE NEGLIGENCE OF THE RAILROAD COMPANY WAS A PROXIMATE CAUSE
OF THE ACCIDENT
The motion for a directed verdict specified that it
was made on the grounds that the evidence showed as a
matter of law that any negligence on the part of the
railroad was not a proximate cause of the injury. It
was also argued as a part of the motion that the sole
cause of the injury was the negligence of Mrs. Jones.
These matters can best be argued together.
We readily admit that the jury could have found
that Mrs. Jones was guilty of negligence in not looking
for the train before 'Pulling onto the crossing. This,
however, is not sufficient to demonstrate that the railroad's negligence was not also a contributing cause. It
is not necessary for us to show that the railroad's negligence was the sole cause of the injury. It is sufficient
in law if we can establish that its neglige:p.ce was a contributing cause.
If the jury had been permitted to find that the railroad was negligent in (a) not giving proper warning
of the t:r~ain 's approach to the crossing, and (b) in the
fireman's f1ailure to warn the engineer of the car's approach, then it would seem to go without argument that
such negligence was one of the contributing causes of
the accident. The evidence shows that the car was proceeding at a slow enough speed, (18 miles per hour),
that it could have been stopped had the driver known
of the approach of the train. If the jury had concluded
20
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that no warning had been given, then there certainly
was a jury question as to whether or not the failure to
give that sig·nal was a contributing CJause of the accident. Likewise, if the fireman who saw the car approaching the crossing without any indication that the
driver knew of the approach of the train, had advised
the engineer of the train's approach, then the train
could have been slowed or the engineer could have been
more diligent in warning the approaching car. Certainly had the fireman warned the engineer of the a pproach of the car, 'and had the engineer then adjusted
to the approaching danger, the accident could have been
avoided. \Ve need not here contend or demonstrate that
the jury would have been compelled to find that the railroad's negligence was a proximate cause of the collision.
The Court directed 'a verdicL In regard to the. issue of
proximate causation, it is sufficient if appellant shows
that the jury could have found, reasonably, that the railroad's negligence was a proximate cause. We submit
that a jury could have so found.
We cite the case of Earle v. Salt Lake if Utah Railroad Company, 109 Utah 111, 165 P. 2d 877, which is in
point on the question of prox;imate cause. The railroad
there argued that as 'a matter of law the failure to
sound a whistle was not a proximate cause of the accident. The Court said,
"Certainly under the state of the record, with
a conflict in the evidence as to whether any crossing warnings were giv.en by the engineer, the
question of whether they were negligent was
properly for the jury. Defendants furthe-r urge
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that the evidence is conclusive, that from a point
on the highway approximately 123 feet south
of the track, there was a clear and unobstructed
view of the track for approximately 84 feet east
from the ·east edge of the highway, that since
the train was traveling much slower than the
automobile, the automobile must have traveled
the last 123 feet before the collision while the
train was moving on the track toward the crossing in full and unobstructed view of the driver
of the car; that this in itself was ample warning
to the driver of the automobile that the train
was approaching, and therefore his failure to
heed this warning was the sole proximate cause
of the accident. . . . It is not the province of
the Court to say that had the train whistled or
rang a bell to signal its approach, the driver
of the car would not have stopped or slowed
down ~and thereby avoided the collision. This
is properly a question for the trier of the fact."
The Court also quoted from Pipvpy v. Oregon Shortline Railroad Company, 79 Utah 439, 11 P. 2d 305, 310,
to the effect that the failure to sound a signal to warn
an approaching car is a proximate cause of a resulting
collision between the train and the car under circumstances such as are here present.
POINT NO. III: THE APPELLANT WAS NOT
GUILTY OF CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE
AS A MATTER OF LAW
It is this third point upon which we believe the
trial court granted the directed verdict. The record
does not show this but the indication from the bench so
suggested. In this regard we believe that the recent
22
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ease of Earle l'. Salt Lake & Utah Railroad Corporation,
109 Utah 111. 165 P. :2d 877, is directly in point. The
facts of that rase and this are 'almost a direct parallel.
Both eases involved a guest riding in an automobile
which had a collision with a train at a railroad crossing.
In the Earle case the plaintiff was a stranger to the
driver of the car and did not know "'hether or not he
was a careful driver. He, therefore, would have had a
greater duty to be attentive. In the instant case the
appellant had ridden with ~frs. Jones on many previous
occasions and had concluded from previous observation
that ~frs. Jones was an attentive and careful driver. (R.
76-77) Her duty to be watchful would thus not have
been as strict as 1n the Earle case. In the Earle case
there were cross arms which warned appr01aching drivers
of the existence of a railroad track. It was undisputed
that the plaintiff in the Earle case saw the cross arms
but did not warn the driver that they were approaching
a railroad track. The court there had a case where the
plaintiff passenger knew they were approaching a railroad crossing, yet he failed to warn the driver. There
was no evidence to suggest that the driver saw the
cross arms. In the instant case the evidence is much
stronger on behalf of the appellant beCJause there is
affirmative and uncontradicted evidence that the driver
knew of the existence of the tracks and that they were
approaching the same. Several witnesses testified that
the car had crossed over the tracks, gone north along
the road a short distance (less than a mile) and had
turned around and was going back toward the tracks.
(R. 75, 191) Therefore, Mrs. Jones had crossed over
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these very tracks not more than five minutes before 'and
the appellant could have safely relied upon the fact that
she knew the tracks existed.
In both cases the plaintiff was a guest. In the
Earle case the "vegetation growing along the east side
of the highway would somewhat obstruct the view of
the track for some distance to the east," but for at least
123 feet there was no obstruction whatsoever and the
car was approaching at a right angle. In the instant
case there was evidence to the effect that the tracks
were considerably higher than the road so that the
occupants of the car would have had to look up at an
angle to s_ee the train. ( R. 68, 91) There is also evidence
to the effect that the car was ahead of the train so that
the train was approaching the car from the rear. (R.
•224~: 104) We realize that the evidence is in conflict on
Jhis point, but l\1rs. Hudson testified that as they came
out of the ravine she looked at the tracks and there was
no train there. ( R. 104) Her vision, under the evidence,
was blocked so that she could not see north along tht>
track, (R. 64, 68) but on the portion of the track which
she could see she looked and there was no train. (R. 104)
Then one of the employees of the railroad \\·as asked
concerning this matter 1and he testified that he was certain that when the car came out of the ravine it wa~
ahead of the train. (R. 224) We have read the transcript of the evidence in the Earle case upon which the
Supreme Court based its decision. Both that transcript
1and the opinion of the court show that the vegetation
growing along the right of way would not completely
hide the train at any point. It partially obscured the
1
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of the car occupants, but it did not block it, and
for the last 1~3 feet tlw view was not obstructed at all,
and the car was approaching at a right angle. In the
instant case the jury could have found that vision was
blocked entirely to the north; that as the car came out
of the ravine the train was to the north; that thereafter
the train approached the car fron1 the rear and that it
was at a higher elevation so that to see it Mrs. Hudson
would have been compelled to look directly back of her
and up at a sharp angle. Under her testimony she did
look at the tracks as the car came out of the ravine, 'and
there was no train on the tracks. (R. 104) Of course she
could not see north along the tracks, but could see them
"head on" as the car came out of the ravine. (R. 64-68)
She looked and the train was not there. (R. 104) From
that point on to the curve up to the track crossing, the
train was behind her and above her. Certainly her opportunity to see the train was not as good as that of
the plaintiff in the Earle case.
In both this and the E~arle case the plaintiff was in
the front seat. In both cases the train struck the side
of the car on which the plaintiff was riding. The only
points of difference in the two cases are in favor of the
appellant's position here. (1) There the plaintiff was
a stranger to the driver and did not know whether or
not he was careful. Here the plaintiff had ridden many
times with :hirs. Jones and had concluded that she was
an attentive driver generally and that she was watching
the road at this time. (R. 77, 102). (2) In both cases the
plaintiffs knew that the car was approaching a crossing
but in the Earle case the plaintiff did not know whether
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l
or not the driver had observed that he was approaching
a train track. Here the plaintiff knew that the driver
knew of the presence of the tracks and that she was
about to cross them. (3) There was no evidence in the
Earle case that the train crew had seen, the car. Here
the crew watched the car for nearly half a mile as it
approached the t~acks. (4) There the speed of both
vehicles was faster so that both needed more time to
adjust to the situation which rapidly developed. Here
the train could have been stopped in a few feet and the
crew was observing the car. The car, had an effort been
made to warn the driver, could have stopped almost up
to the point of impact. ( 5) There the view was unobstructed entirely for 1:23 feet immediately before the
crossing. Here the train was to the rear of the car
and above it so that it could only be seen by looking
back and up at an angle. We simply cannot see how
the trial court could be susbained here unless the Earle
case is to be now overruled. The cases to follow will
demonstrate that the Earle case is in complete harmony
with earlier cases from this state and with the cases
from other jurisdiction.
The court in the Earle case cited and quoted from
two cases arising out of a single accident. In the first
case, Shortino v. Salt Lake & Utah Railroad Company,
52 Utah 476, 174 P. 860, 866, the court noted the duty
of the driver of the car. In M ontagu~ v. Salt Lake &
Utah Railroad Company, 52 U tJah 368, 174 P. 871, 872,
the court noted the duty of a guest. The guest rule there
set forth was reapproved by the Earle case and is apparently the rule in Utah today. It is as follows:
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" ... the plaintiff was not charged with the
san1e ~trict legal duty of keeping· a lookout and
being wa trhful as the owner and driver of the
automobile, .Jlr. Shortino.
''The rule applicable here, which is adopted
by the Supreme Court of l\[innesota in the case
of Cotton v. Willma.r & San Francisco Railroad
Company, 99 ~linn. 366, 109 N.,V. 835, 8 L.R.A.
X.S. 643, 116 Am. St. Rep. 422, 9 Ann. Cas.
935, which case is cited and followed in the
Atwood case, supra, is stated thus: 'The rule
which has met with general approval in the
more recent cases made the passenger r~spons
ible only for his personal negligence, an<:l leaves
it to the jury to determine whether, under the
circumstances, he was justified in trusting his
safety to the care of the driver and not looking
or listening for himself. The negligence qf the
drhrer is thus not imputed to the guests or
passenger, but the circumstances may be such
as to make it the duty of the passeng~r to look
and listen and attempt to control the. driver for
his own protection.''
In a third case arising out of this ~arne (Shortino)
accident, Cowan v. Salt Lake & Utah Railroad ()o~pany,
56 Utah 94, 189 P. 599, 605, /the court _reviews most of
the Utah cases in great _detail and concludefi by affirming the rule of Atwood v. Utah Light & R. Company,.44
Utah 366, 140 P. 137, 139, and the Minnesota cm,se quoted
above. In commenting on these earlier cases, th_e :Utah
Supreme Court -said in Earle _case that the rule announced is ''that .contributory negligence sh_o_uld be left
to the jury 'unless that question is f~e·.f:r:om substantial
doubt.' "
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In the Atwood case the court quoted with approval
from another Minnesota case as follows:
" 'We think that it would hardly occur to
a man of ordinary prudence, when riding as a
·passenger with a competent driver, who he had
no reason to suppose was neglecting his duty,
that he be required, when approaching a railway crossing, to exercise the same degree of
vigilance in looking and listening for approaching trains that he would if he himself had the
control and management of the team.' ''
The Utah court then commented : ''This seems to
us good sense as well as good law.'' It is this rule which
was expressly affirmed again in the Earle case. The
cases from other states are to like effect. In this regard
we confine ourselves to cases of unobstructed vision and
passengers in the front seat.
In Gate v. Fresno Traction Company, (Cal.) 2 P.
(2d) 364, the defendant operated an electric trolley
line on regular schedule between Fresno and the town
of Pine Dale. The line crossed Shaw Avenue 1at a point
about five miles from the city of Fresno in a level and
sparsely settled country. The deceased, a woman thirty
five years of age, was a passenger in an automobile which
was driven in a westerly direction toward the intersection, while the trolley car involved in the collision was
approaching from the south. For 637 feet along Shaw
Avenue before reaching the tracks there was nothing to
obstruct either the driver's or the passenger's vision of
the electrical car. The ground was level, no foliage,
house or other obstruction of any kind existed. It was in
28
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

'-

.-.·.

the open country and there was a standard railroad crossing sign. The driver testified that as they approached
the crossing and at a distance of about sixty or eighty feet
therefrom they both looked to the right and he looked to
the left. He further testified that he saw nothing, that the
deceased said nothing until just before the collision
when she said, "Lord, there's a car." There WJas a
conflict as to whether the motorman gave a warning
signal. When the motorman first observed the automobile the electric car was going 18 or 19 miles per hour
and when it approached the crossing it had been slowed
down to 17 miles per hour. The speed of the automobile
was from 18-22 miles per hour. The court refused to
hold that the passenger was guilty of contributory
negligence.

In Hopkins v. Pacific Electric Ry. Co., 118 P. (2d)
872, (California), the guest was riding in the front seat
beside the driver. The intersection was unobstructed.
The guest did not look for a train, though familiar with
the crossing. Having no warning of approaching danger
he could do nothing to W!arn the driver of it. The court
said:
''Defendants also urge that Hopkins was
guilty of contributory negligence as a matter
of law. This argument finds little evidentiary
support. Hopkins was the guest of Johnson,
and the negligence of Johnson, if any, was not
imputable to him. Johnson was in no way subject to the control of Hopkins, nor under his
supervision or direction as to the m•anner in
which he operated the automobile . . . . The deceased had the right to assume that the driver
29
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was competent, that he knew the capacity of
his machine, and that he would not put it in
a !)erilous position. It follows that we can not
conclude that Hopkins was guilty of contributory
negligence as a matter of law."
In Atlanta and W. P. R. Co .. v. McCord, (Ga.) 189
S.E. 403, the court held that a person riding in an automobile as the guest of another who is operating the automobile is not as a matter of law guilty of negligence
barring recovery 1against the railroad company for an
injury received by him in failing to observe the approaching train, although the view down the track for
over a half mile was unobstructed.
See also Gorman v. Franklin, (Mo.), 117 S.W. (2d)
289; Carson v. Thompson, (Mo.), 161 S:\V. (2d) 995;
Gifford v. Pa .. R. Co., (New Jersey), 196 Atl. 679; Scheer
v. Long Island R. Co., 34 N.Y.S. (2d) 25; Anstine v. Pa.
R. Co. (Pa.), 20 Atl. (2d) 774; Valera v. Reading Co.,
(Pa.), 36 Atl. (2d) 644; Wichita Valley Ry. Co. v. Durrett, (Tex.), 17 S.W. (2d) 329; Oulf M. & 0. R. Co. v.
Underwood, (Tenn.), 187 S.W. (2d) 777; Cox v. Polson
Logging Co., (Wash.), 138 P. (2d) 169; Parsons v. N.Y.
Central R. Co., (West Va.), 34 S.E. 334; Koscuik v. Sherf,
(Wise.), 272 N.W. 8; Chicago and E. I. Railway Co. v.
Felling, (Ind.), 200 N.E. 441; Finley v. Lowden, (Iowa),
277 N.W. 487; Frideres v. Lowden, (Iowa), 17 N.W. (2d)
396; and Lang v. Chicago & N. 'W. Ry. Co., (Minn.), 295
N.W.57.
It seems clear that the plaintiff here had no control
over the car and no right to exercise control. She did
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not observe the train before the collision was unavoidable and she had no duty to observe it. She knew the
driYer, had observed that the driver was careful and
attentive. They were not speeding, the driver was looking straight ahead and watching the road, her attention
was not detracted. She knew that the driver knew of
the presence of the railroad track. She had observed
the railroad tracks as the car carne out of the ravine
and did not see any h~ain there. She then relied upon
the driver to watch the road and the tracks from that
point to the crossing, but just as the car went up on to
the crossing she looked and observed the train and
warned ~Irs. Jones immediately. It is obvious that she
could have seen the train had she looked backward and
up at an angle, but under the Utah cases she had no
absolute duty to do so. She had a right to rely upon
:Jirs. Jones watching the road and the railroad tracks.
LAST CLEAR CHANCE

If the court were to conclude, notwithstanding the
above~ that ~Irs. Hudson was guilty of contributory

t';

[J1l

negligence as a matter of law, we believe that the railroad had the last clear chance to avoid the accident. It
is not contradicted that it observed the car approaching
the track at a speed of approximately 18 miles per hour.
The car had done nothing to indicate that the driver
had seen the train. Its speed was so slow that it could
have stopped almost instantly. As it continued to !approach the tracks without slackening its speed, all that
the defendant would have had to do to avoid the collision was to give a blast of the whistle. At that point
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the train and the ear were so close together that even a
driver who was completely inattentive could have heard
the whistle. We do not here have a situation of a car
and a train each approaching the crossing at a rapid
speed. lJnder the evidence the jury could have found
the train to be going as slow as 15 miles per hour and
the car at 18 miles per hour. The jury would have been
compelled to find that the train crew was Wla tching the
car approaching the tracks. It would have been compelled to find that the car had not slackened speed or
done anything to indicate that the driver had seen the
train. There certainly Wlas a point at which the train
crew knew full well that the car was going up on to the
tracks. As the car went up to the tracks it was going
uphill at a very slow speed. A sounding of the whistle
most certainly would have stopped the car. We submit
that the train crew was guilty of negligence in not sounding the whistle at that point, and that it did have the
last clear chance to stop the car and avoid the accident.
We respectfully submit that the trial court erred
in directing a verdict against the plaintiff.
Respectfully submitted,
EDWARD W. CLYDE,
ALLAN E. MECHAM,
WOODROW D. WHITE,
Attorneys for Plaintiff
and Appellant.
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